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In recent years, certain attempts to promote sustainable transport have fallen victim to the impact 
of ‘unintended consequences’ on decision-making and policy outcomes. The pressure that EU 
biofuel targets place on global food production, and the role they play in facilitating 
deforestation, are well-known examples. This article highlights how policymakers’ failure to 
consider evidence relating to the potential impacts of biofuel mandates in the early 2000s led to a 
host of complex problems developing over subsequent years. Drawing on the concept of problem 
‘framing’, the article then examines the extent of policy learning that has taken place since the 
Biofuels Directive was implemented in 2003. While acknowledging that not all eventualities can 
be prepared for, the article highlights the importance of enhanced communication and 
collaboration across different levels and departments of government in policymaking processes 
as a means of promoting learning, especially when dealing with complex cross-cutting and 
international social, environmental and economic problems. 
Keywords: biofuels, environmental policy, framing, indirect land-use change, policy learning, 
sustainability 
 
The rise (and fall) of biofuels in Europe 
The need to decarbonise the road transport system has become clearer over the past 20 years, 
and policy responses have emerged at different levels to try and mitigate the climate impacts 
of what is an almost exclusively oil-dependent sector. Crop-derived or ‘bio’ fuels gained 
much attention from the mid-1990s as one of the forerunning solutions to this problem, not 
least because their use does not require the road transport system to undergo significant or 
radical transformations. While significant policy measures designed to stimulate the 
increased use of biofuels as substitutes for petrol and diesel have therefore been introduced 
on both sides of the Atlantic, concerns about the potential environmental and social impacts 
of large-scale biofuel production also have a long history. 
At the European level, formal plans to expand transport biofuel consumption can be traced to 
the European Commission’s (2001) White Paper. Acknowledging the need to redouble 




the Commission used this document to make an ambitious long-term plea to replace 20% of 
conventional road fuels with substitute fuels by 2020. Biofuels were highlighted as the ‘most 
promising forms… in the short and medium term’ (European Commission, 2001, p. 86), and 
the White Paper therefore put forward proposals for a new directive obligating minimum 
levels of biofuel blending into conventional petrol and diesel across all Member States, to 
reach a rate of almost 6%, as measured by energy content, by 2010. 
Importantly, when it emerged, the 2003 Biofuels Directive (European Commission, 2003) 
was justified not only on the basis of biofuels’ purported ability to reduce Europe’s energy 
dependency and mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the road transport sector, but 
also because of the view of biofuels as a tool for diversifying production and creating jobs in 
the agricultural sector. This three-pronged rationale was initially extremely compelling to a 
wide range of actors and stakeholders. In the UK context, for instance, support for biofuels in 
the years immediately following the passing of the Biofuels Directive was manifest in a 
Biofuels Declaration, whose signatories included British Sugar, Saab, Ford, the National 
Farmers’ Union, and Friends of the Earth (Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership, 2005). 
Similarly, a year earlier, no fewer than five environmental non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) – the Green Alliance, Transport 2000 (now the Campaign for Better Transport), 
Friends of the Earth, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) UK and the Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds (RSPB) – had also called for the Government to ‘encourage the use of 
biofuels’ (The Guardian, 2004). 
Despite their initially widespread appeal however, by the time the UK Government had 
outlined proposals for a Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation (RTFO) in 2007, the image of 
biofuels as a ‘silver bullet’ for the road transport sector had been tarnished significantly. 
Several sets of issues were highlighted, including the potential impact of biofuel production 
on food prices and food security, on deforestation and biodiversity loss, and even on labour 
standards and land rights in certain parts of the world (for example Costa, 2009; EAC, 2008; 
Koh & Ghazoul, 2008; Royal Society, 2008; RSPB, 2008). The chief scientific adviser to the 
UK Government’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs went as far as to 
claim that the RTFO would be an ‘insane’ policy if decision-makers couldn’t be certain of its 
positive environmental effects (BBC News, 2008). Most damaging of all, perhaps, was the 
emergent problem of indirect land-use change (ILUC), a phenomenon identified in two 




Polasky & Hawthorne, 2008; Searchinger et al., 2008) as having the potential to render 
biofuels’ overall carbon footprint significantly more damaging for the global climate than the 
petrol and diesel which they were replacing. 
Controversially, in the face of all of these concerns, the European Union ultimately 
reinforced its commitment to biofuels with the passing of the Renewable Energy Directive 
(RED) in 2009 (European Commission, 2009). In superseding the Biofuels Directive, the 
RED put in place obligatory targets for all Member States to replace 10% of their road 
transport fuel by 2020 with fuels derived from renewable resources. Biofuels are expected to 
contribute the majority of that 10%. On the surface it therefore appears that the diverse 
negative consequences potentially associated with biofuel production have made little 
difference to the support being granted to this practice by policies implemented at the 
European level. 
Drawing on this rich case study, the relationship between problem framing, evidence 
gathering processes, and policy learning at the EU level is examined from an interpretive 
perspective. Focussing on two sets of questions, in particular those pertaining to the 
geographical origin of biofuels, and those pertaining to their propensity to stimulate ILUC, it 
is argued that policy learning – and indeed evidence-based policymaking itself – are 
necessarily iterative, messy processes. The case study arguably has significant implications 
for a number of theoretical literatures exploring the complexities of evidence-based policy 
and policy learning, particularly where decision makers face complex problems imbricating 
energy systems and the environmental agenda. It also offers a number of insights for 
practitioners seeking to make contemporary governance institutions and arrangements more 
discerning and perceptive of the full potential impacts of decisions taken on similar issues in 
the future. 
Problem framing and policy learning: an overview 
Within political science, it is widely accepted that the contentiousness of policymaking 
becomes especially pronounced in situations where decision makers ‘face “wicked” 
problems, complex influences, shifting commitments, and moral complexity in their daily 
efforts to act on policy goals’ (Hajer & Laws, 2006, p. 251). Indeed, given the inherently 
contested nature of much apparently objective knowledge regarding complex policy 
problems, ‘it is often the case that [actors] will not even be able to agree on what the problem 




contradictory certainties’ (Hajer & Laws, 2006, p.252, emphasis in original; see also 
Weinberg, 1972). Environmental and climate change policymaking arguably presents 
particularly challenging complexities and ambiguities for policymakers to overcome in these 
respects (Hoppe, 2010). For instance, Schneider (2001) posits that in environmental policy: 
‘Policymakers struggle to make decisions using vague and ambiguous concepts (such as 
sustainability), with sparse and imprecise information, in decisions that have far-reaching, 
and often irreversible, impacts on both environment and society’ (p. 4673). 
In light of these difficulties, many political scientists have turned to interpretive conceptual 
tools, which aim to elucidate how actors ‘allocate particular significance to specific social or 
physical events’ over others in order to make sense of the world around them (Hajer & Laws, 
2006, p. 252). Following Foucault (2002), interpretive policy analysts argue that particular 
‘discursive formations’ operate to ‘determine what can and cannot be thought’ in particular 
fields of debate and discussion, thereby constraining the range of legitimate options available 
for dealing with policy problems (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, p. 178). 
In seeking to illustrate how ‘discursive formations’ might manifest themselves in real-world 
policy debates, many scholars (for example, Hoppe, 2010) have highlighted the influence of 
so-called policy ‘frames’, which allegedly operate as ‘special types of story that...provide 
stability and structure by narrating a problem-centred discourse...over time’ (Laws & Rein, 
2003, p. 174). Crucially for interpretive academics, while ‘frames’ can often operate to 
constrain policy, by reifying particular accounts of a problem, their innate simplicity also 
leaves them vulnerable to attack, particularly where actors are able to find empirical evidence 
that undermines them. The ability to create or modify a persuasive storyline about biofuels, 
or indeed to ‘reframe’ the issue altogether (Rein & Schön, 1991), would therefore be 
regarded by interpretive policy analysts as a crucial source of political power, and moreover 
as a potentially critical driver of policy learning.  
Indeed, given the right conditions, discursive framing might impact upon policy learning both 
instrumentally and conceptually (Radaelli, 1995). In the former case where a frame is 
mobilised in order to reinforce pre-existing value allocations or institutional arrangements, 
and in the latter where it is imbricated in a more reflexive process of ‘double loop’ learning 
(Argyris & Schön, 1978), it calls into question the very purpose of policy itself. Where a 
dominant framing of a problem is well embedded throughout the policymaking community 




redrawn, may be missed, and any learning that does occur will be only instrumental in nature; 
focussed on improving the efficacy and efficiency of existing policy tools and frameworks. 
As Hoppe (2010) puts it, policymakers are often unprepared to undertake ‘boundary work’, 
instead continuing to frame problems as structured, and fitting them into existing models or 
breaking them down into smaller sub-problems. Such circumstances may even lead evidence 
to be deliberately disregarded: 
An expert’s opinion may be embraced or rejected solely on the basis of its 
compatibility with the needs of influential political figures at that moment in time. 
Similarly, uncertainty in that knowledge and opinion may be discarded or inflated 
because of political bias. (Streets & Glantz, 2000, p. 104) 
In a similar vein, in reflecting on his long-term analysis of UK economic policy, Hall (1993, 
p. 290) argues that ideas and institutions will often ‘reinforce each other’, producing ‘long 
periods of continuity’ characterised by only minor policy changes. At the same time however, 
he also argues that ideas possess a ‘status somewhat independent of institutions that can be 
used’ to initiate paradigm shifts in the philosophical ideas underpinning policy, where the 
very aims and objectives of government intervention are called into question (Hall, 1993, p. 
290). The theoretical question to be resolved, therefore, concerns how, when and under what 
circumstances ideas come to initiate a paradigm shift or ‘reframing’. 
Biofuels in Europe: best-laid plans or tunnel vision?      
The challenge taken up by this article is to use the case of EU biofuels policy to examine in 
more detail the interactions of ideas and institutions, as well as of framings and policy 
learning. The analysis that follows therefore aims to tease out some distinct aspects of EU 
policymaking processes that have served to constrain the ability of policymakers to learn 
conceptually, and not just instrumentally, about the impacts of biofuel mandates since the 
initial passing of the Biofuels Directive in 2003. Specifically, these aspects concern firstly the 
scope of biofuel supply chains, and secondly the contribution of biofuel production to 
potentially damaging land-use changes. 
Sourcing biofuels: the question of supply chain geography 
Amongst the most immediately obvious consequences of the implementation of the EU’s 
Biofuels Directive in 2003 was the establishment of a novel, global set of supply chains and 
market interactions relating to the production of biofuel feedstocks. Typically, these comprise 




already grown in vast quantities across the world for food, animal feed, cosmetic production 
and other end uses. The EU’s stipulation of a new 5.75% target for biofuel blending in the 
road transport sector can, therefore, effectively be viewed as placing a new set of demands 
upon existing supply chains relating to these feedstocks: a demand that eventually came to be 
cast by many groups as the principle cause of significant food price increases in late 2007. 
The complex, global extent of these supply chains is ultimately permitted by a combination 
of biophysical, logistical and legal factors. Biophysically, the feasibility of producing biofuel 
feedstocks for consumption in the EU in locations far from European soil arguably owes 
much to the superior yields, and thus the greater economic revenues can be obtained from 
agricultural cultivation in sub-tropical climates: for instance through growing oil palm in 
countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. Logistically, pre-existing supply chains linking 
agricultural activity in one part of the world with purchasers and end-users in another exerted 
their own, path-dependent influence over the shape and scope of embryonic biofuel 
production networks. Meanwhile, the insurmountable nature of barriers to free trade erected 
under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation’s General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade also legally prevented European policymakers from implementing clauses in the 
Biofuels Directive that would have privileged biofuels produced solely within Europe, over 
those produced fully or partly outside of the continent, for instance through large tax breaks 
or burdensome import customs duties (Ponte & Daugbjerg, 2015). 
While the inevitability of the global scope of biofuel supply chains is clear with hindsight, 
prior to the passing of the Biofuels Directive policymakers arguably placed greater emphasis 
in their accounts of this policy on its potential to provide stimulus to domestic (i.e. intra-EU) 
agricultural production systems. In official documentation such as its 2001 Transport White 
Paper for instance, the European Commission implied that large-scale domestic production of 
biofuels was not only feasible, but also – in light of impending reforms to the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy – eminently desirable. According to the European Commission (2001, p. 
83): ‘The production of raw materials for biofuels may be of particular interest under the 
Common Agricultural Policy for creating new economic resources and preserving 
employment.’  
Rather than presenting a formal, ex-ante assessment of the potential for the Biofuels 
Directive to interact with pre-existing international agricultural supply chains, policymakers 




agricultural community. Moreover, and as the following quote from a European Commission 
official serves to indicate, in some cases at least, policymakers were apparently content to 
discount the potential for non-domestic biofuel production altogether: 
We had a very specific situation in the EU, because the idea was that all this 
biofuel was going to be grown on set-aside land…In a nutshell I would say [it] 
was put in place to rescue the Common Agricultural Policy. (European 
Commission Official, Interview, 2010) 
Such comments reveal a lack of distinction and clarity over the primary objective in the 
promotion of biofuels: publicly an environmental initiative to reduce GHG emissions, yet 
privately, at least in some sections of the European Commission, ‘a new form of agricultural 
support policy’ (Ackrill & Kay, 2014, p. 13). Drawing on Hoppe’s (2010) concept of 
problem framing, we argue here that in their haste to position biofuels as a flagship climate 
change policy in the transport sector, EU policymakers overlooked the inevitably multi-scalar 
dimensions of biofuel production systems, as well as their important linkages to other 
agricultural sectors. Consequently, ex-ante assessments of the possible impacts of an EU 
biofuels target were relatively unconcerned with international ramifications (whether positive 
or negative), focussing instead on ostensibly positive domestic implications for Europe’s 
GHG emissions profile, energy security and rural economy. This framing of biofuels as a 
silver bullet for Europe importantly enabled proposals for a Biofuels Directive to satisfy the 
interests of the agricultural lobby while simultaneously being seen to be addressing an 
important environmental issue. The ultimate result, however, represents a clear demonstration 
of the ability of persuasive framings to impact significantly on the scope of evidence that is 
considered relevant to policymaking, particularly where an entirely new policy is being 
developed, as in this case. 
ILUC: questions of expansion and intensification 
The issue of ILUC, whereby biofuel production displaces existing agricultural activity into 
new geographical territory, represents a second significant unforeseen consequence of EU 
biofuels policy to have emerged since 2003. Public awareness of this issue can arguably be 
traced to a now famous article published in Science in early 2008, in which estimates were 
presented of the quantity of GHG emissions that could arise from land-use change – 
essentially involving the conversion of non-agricultural landscapes to agricultural ones – 




suggested that such emissions might be so significant as to take up to 167 years to reclaim 
through the subsequent use of biofuels as substitutes for fossil fuel in the road transport 
sector. While certain underpinning assumptions in Searchinger et al.’s (2008) paper have 
been called into question, a substantial quantity of additional modelling and analysis has 
reinforced the overarching conclusions that, firstly, biofuels do generate ILUC, and, 
secondly, this can have potentially significant consequences for the GHG emissions footprint 
of biofuels (Edwards, Mulligan & Marelli, 2010; Ahlgren & Di Lucia, 2014). 
Almost exactly two weeks before Searchinger et al.’s (2008) analysis was published in 
Science, the European Commission published its official Impact Assessment for what would 
eventually become the Renewable Energy Directive (European Commission, 2008). 
Intriguingly, this document directly acknowledges concern over the issue of ILUC stating: 
Some commentators imply that each hectare of land devoted to the cultivation 
of crops for the biofuel market will have to be offset by finding a hectare of 
land, somewhere else, to produce the food that would (it is suggested) 
otherwise have been produced on the biofuel-producing land. (European 
Commission, 2008, p. 144) 
It is not possible to verify whether policymakers were aware of the precise substance of the 
analysis by Searchinger et al. (2008). The admission in the draft Impact Assessment 
document (jointly prepared by officials working in the Directorates-General for Transport 
and Energy, DG TREN, and for Environment, DG ENV), that certain commentators had 
drawn attention to the issue precludes the possibility that ILUC was unknown within the 
European Commission at that time. However, no attempt to assess the possible risks 
associated with ILUC appears in the Commission’s official Impact Assessment. Instead, this 
document contends that the issue does not deserve further attention from policymakers. 
Specifically, the Impact Assessment dismisses claims that biofuel production could stimulate 
ILUC by quoting historical data supplied by the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organisation, 
which shows that around 70% of global increases in oil crop production between 1980 and 
2006 were attributable not to land expansion, but to increases in agricultural productivity. 
Having thus identified what they term ‘a clear link between demand for agricultural 
commodities, their prices, investment in agriculture and agricultural productivity’, the 
Assessment’s authors then simply extrapolate this supposedly robust link into the future, by 




productivity, not an increase in the quantity of land used for agriculture’ (European 
Commission, 2008, p. 144).  
In short, in the proposals accompanying the official Impact Assessment (which were to 
become the Renewable Energy Directive), the European Commission suggests that ILUC 
would in all likelihood not occur as a result of the policy. Assumptions about the potential for 
significant yield increases therefore operated in this instance in much the same way as 
assumptions about the domestic origin of biofuels had done some years earlier, effectively 
exonerating policymakers from any duty to consider the wider, international impacts of their 
legislation, this time on patterns of land-use change outside of Europe. 
Improving the policy process 
The extensive literatures on policy framing and policy learning highlight a number of 
challenges; yet it is also possible to identify four ways in which the integration of relevant 
evidence into policymaking could be substantially improved, and the scope and pace of 
policy learning could be expanded in the face of complex environmental problems. 
Frame issues carefully and collectively 
Hisschemöller & Hoppe (1996) suggest that more explicit contemplation of the socio-
political structure into which policy measures are introduced, and of the definitions of 
prevailing problems when they arise, would be worthwhile endeavours. Indeed, more open 
and inclusive debate around the nature of the policy objectives being pursued by a biofuels 
mandate, as well as the geographical scope of the consequences, would arguably have been 
useful before the passing of the 2003 Biofuels Directive. The framing of biofuels as a 
climate-based transport policy neglected to acknowledge the multi-scalar dimensions of their 
production systems or the fundamental links to the wider agricultural implications, clearly 
highlighting that, without considered collective framing of issues, adequate policy responses 
cannot be delivered. In thinking about the future of biofuels in Europe and further afield, a 
much more holistic perspective of the complex relationships between agriculture, trade, 
energy, climate and transport may yield more effective policy responses. Standing in the way 
of such progress, however, is the institutional structure of the EU (and other political 
regimes), as it is currently inadequate to enable such cross-cutting, multidisciplinary work to 
take place. The institutional architecture of the current system is too rigid and siloed to enable 
such ‘boundary work’ across conventional policy domains. Moreover, such approaches 




dominant framings and the impact that this might have on how they use available knowledge 
and gather and interpret evidence in pursuit of policy objectives. More detailed attention to 
these issues is required and could form the basis of future research. 
Normalise iterative approaches 
As highlighted above, iterative approaches are required to monitor the success of particular 
measures. Lindblom (1959) suggested that ‘successive comparisons’ are preferable to 
traditional rational comprehensive methods of assessing policy measures. This is because it 
enables the consideration of alternatives. Lindblom’s work with Woodhouse emphasised that 
trial and error learning was more favourable to permanent learning (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 
1993). Indeed, setting indiscriminate biofuel targets, and concomitantly committing to the 
development of an entirely new industry, offered little opportunity to monitor success or 
failure in this case, and certainly not to modify the prevailing policy approach. Experimenting 
with small-scale biofuel production and selectively ramping up investment into particular 
types of biofuel technology, based on the careful assessment of achievable crop yields, 
emissions reduction capabilities, and environmental impacts, may well have been a more 
suitable initial approach, to enable the derived learning to be incorporated into the broader 
policy landscape. For instance, while it was not proposed in debates leading to the 
development of the Biofuels Directive, the adoption of insights from small-scale pilots in 
different contexts would perhaps have allowed for a more successfully staged full-scale roll 
out of production, and ultimately the development of a more sustainable European biofuel 
market.  
Emphasise positive learning over negative mistakes 
Hisschemöller & Hoppe (1996) advocate a learning strategy to cope with intractable 
controversies. Although as Schneider (2001) points out, a surprise cannot by definition be 
anticipated, Streets & Glantz (2000) suggest that once a surprise has occurred, a window 
exists for positive change or remedial action, from which lessons can be learned. Much is 
continually being learned from the complexities of the biofuels case, yet policymakers have 
for the most part adopted a defensive stance in the face of new evidence and ideas, seeking to 
entrench and re-rationalise their initial decisions, rather than embracing the opportunity to 
make beneficial adjustments. Uncertainties can of course only be reduced through more data 




uncertainty into decision-making and policy processes would arguably enable a better 
management of unforeseen situations when they do arise. 
Routinise transparency and collaboration 
Collingridge (1992) suggests that government has an important role to play in independently 
defining the normative goals of policy, and that greater transparency is needed in 
policymaking, ensuring that any given government exerts genuine control and does not 
merely reflect business interest and views. In a related manner, greater transparency is also 
required in policymakers’ use of expert knowledge, as was not evident in the case of 
knowledge relating to ILUC. While Richter (2010) asserts that timely technical advice is an 
important element in the decision-making process, identifying the best available advice in a 
complex debate is arguably not possible without first subscribing to a particular framing of 
the issues at hand. Under these conditions, utilising knowledge, evidence or opinion more 
transparently would also force policymakers to be more open and explicit about the 
assumptions underpinning their decisions. This recommendation is in turn linked to the need 
for better collaboration, and supports Hisschemöller & Hoppe’s (1996) suggestion that actors 
with different views should be engaged more substantively throughout the policymaking 
process. As noted above, ensuring that the multi-scalar dimensions of any given problem is 
understood and that ‘boundary work’ is done effectively are both important in collaboration. 
Conclusions 
Importantly, when it did emerge in 2009, the Renewable Energy Directive was notable for its 
stipulation of a number of sustainability criteria that biofuels should meet in order to be 
eligible for financial support, and indeed order to count towards the Commission’s 10% 
target for renewable energy in the transport sector (Di Lucia, Ahlgren, & Ericsson, 2012). 
From an interpretive perspective, these criteria can be viewed as the outputs of a good deal of 
policy learning on the part of EU officials in the six years since the Biofuels Directive had 
been passed. No longer did policymakers assume that biofuels would be sourced entirely 
domestically, and in requiring producers to demonstrate that they had not cultivated biofuels 
on land with high biodiversity value or high carbon stock, the criteria point to a more 
nuanced understanding of the complexities involved in ensuring that their potential 
environmental benefits are yielded in practice. Yet the absence of any protections against 




the issue by December 2010) also makes clear that such learning did not extend to a 
reappraisal of the overall wisdom of an indiscriminate target for biofuel blending.  
When the Commission published its 2010 report on ILUC, it acknowledged that ILUC could 
have an impact on greenhouse gas emissions savings associated with biofuels, and that 
without intervention, this could under certain circumstances reduce their contribution to the 
goals of the RED (European Commission, 2010). However, the Commission delayed 
publishing a full Impact Assessment of different options for intervening to reduce ILUC’s 
impacts until October 2012, nearly two years later. Eventually, this Impact Assessment 
proposed to tackle ILUC only by ‘capping’ the contribution that could be made to targets 
under the Renewable Energy Directive by ‘food-based biofuels’ (specifically to 5% of the 
10% required) (European Commission, 2012).  More recently still, even this initial proposal 
has been watered down, with the European Parliament only finally approving a 7% cap on 
food-based biofuels in April 2015 (EurActiv, 2015). Estimates of the scale of ILUC 
associated with specific consignments of biofuel must also now be reported by producers, 
although no provision has yet been made to preclude biofuels – whether derived from food 
crops or not – with high ILUC estimates from contributing to the overall 10% target 
embodied in the RED. Moreover, the European Commission explicitly justified its decision 
not to discriminate between biofuels on this basis by stating that to do so would result in ‘the 
exclusion of all vegetable oil biodiesel, which today represents the vast majority of the 
market’ (European Commission, 2012, pp. 5-6). Arguably, this justification suggests that the 
imperative of reaching the 10% target as efficiently as possible, regardless of the potential 
environmental impacts, remains the key concern of EU policymakers today. 
Overall therefore, the case presented in this article indicates that policy learning relating to 
biofuels at the EU level has been instrumental only; limited in scope to honing and finessing 
existing tools (mandated blending targets) while overlooking the potential for more 
fundamental reconsideration of the goals and objectives embodied by those tools. However, it 
is acknowledged in the literature that such transformative change takes time; according to 
Weiss (1977), new evidence or ideas can sometimes take decades to embed themselves into 
the system, and the process requires persistence on the part of those advocating change and 
providing knowledge. To achieve more conceptual learning also requires changes to be made 




there are no quick wins or guarantees that lessons can be learned and embedded into the 
system.  
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